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THE ROLE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER IN FIRM 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 
Timothy D. Hubbard, Ph.D.* 
ABSTRACT 
Investments in environmental programs have not been met with 
definitive scientific evidence of their positive influence on corporate 
financial performance; yet, we still see executives investing in such 
programs. Given this observation, those working on environmental 
issues should have a firm understanding of the factors that influence 
an executive’s decision to invest, or not invest, in environmental 
programs. This Article reviews the latest scientific literature on the 
influence Chief Executive Officers have on firm outcomes, the 
rationales for investing in environmental programs, and the executive 
characteristics, social factors, and structures that play into their 
decision-making process. 
INTRODUCTION 
Investments in environmental programs are not uniformly 
implemented across firms. One potential reason is that there has not 
been widely held agreement among scholars that such investments are 
consistently profitable. Indeed, studies have found mixed results when 
examining the impact of environmental programs—and, more 
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generally, across a large swath of other socially responsible programs.1 
This—combined with the observation that large-scale investments in 
environmental programs are visible, potentially contestable, and open 
to scrutiny—may make it difficult for some executives to choose to 
make such investments. Indeed, research has shown that investing in 
environmentally and socially responsible programs while firm 
performance lags significantly increases the likelihood of Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) dismissal.2 
Given these challenges, if we want to better understand the adoption 
and implementation of environmental programs within firms, we must 
understand the executives leading the firms. Research increasingly 
shows the impact that CEOs have on firms. Quantifying this impact, a 
2016 study showed that CEOs account for approximately twenty-two 
percent of variance in firm performance.3 It is likely that CEOs explain 
an even greater proportion of variance in more proximal decisions, 
such as investments in environmental programs and the environmental 
performance of the firm. 
Against this backdrop, if we want to better understand the level of 
investment in, support for, and care about the environment, 
environmental lawyers and other stakeholders will have to continue to 
work with leaders in the upper echelons of firms. To be effective at 
this, we must continue to better understand CEOs. This Article—a 
synthesis of a talk I gave at Fordham University Law Review’s 
symposium titled “Corporate Sustainability in the Era of Shifting 
Federal Priorities”—tries to synthesize the broad scientific literature 
that examines the characteristics of CEOs, their social environment, 
and other structures that lead to greater investments in environmental 
programs. 
                                                                 
 1. See John Peloza, The Challenge of Measuring Financial Impacts from 
Investments in Corporate Social Performance, 35 J. MGMT. 1518 (2009). 
 2. Timothy D. Hubbard et al., Higher Highs and Lower Lows: The Role of 
Corporate Social Responsibility in CEO Dismissal, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 2255, 
2263 (2017). 
 3. Timothy J. Quigley & Scott D. Graffin, Reaffirming the CEO effect is 
significant and much larger than chance: A comment on Fitza, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 793, 794 (2017); see also Timothy J. Quigley & Donald C. Hambrick, Has the 
“CEO effect” increased in recent decades? A new explanation for the great rise in 
America’s attention to corporate leaders, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 821 (2014). 
2018] ROLE OF CEO IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 15 
 
Overall, this Article contributes to literature and practice by 
providing a framework for understanding how executives factor into 
the execution of environmental and sustainability programs within 
firms. I begin by discussing the rise and prominence of the CEO. Next, 
I outline the current state of the literature regarding the linkage 
between environmental programs and firm financial performance. I 
then go through some of the motivations for making investments in 
environmental programs. Finally, I review the current literature on 
executive characteristics, social factors, and structural factors that 
influence environmental and social performance of firms. The 
overarching goal of this Article is to equip readers with an 
understanding of the state of mind of executives as they navigate the 
complex landscape of environmental engagement within their firm. 
THE RISE AND PROMINENCE OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER 
CEOs have become increasingly prominent and influential over the 
past decades, achieving an almost superstar status. Prominent CEOs 
such as Steve Jobs, Warren Buffett, and Jack Welch have dominated 
the news and become part of everyday life for people across the world. 
Indeed, their pay alone makes them newsworthy: “The median [ratio 
of their chief executives’ pay to the median earnings of employees] is 
127 to 1, but some of the most recognized brands are outliers.”4 
Part of this hero status and commensurate compensation is deserved. 
CEOs of large firms have had an increasing influence on the 
performance of firms. In the 1950s and 1960s, CEOs accounted for 
approximately 14% of the variance in a firm’s return on assets. This 
number increased to 18% in the 1970s and 1980s and has now reached 
almost 23% over the past two decades. Given this rise in the impact a 
CEO has on firm financial performance—a very distal outcome—their 
influence on the performance of investments in environmentally 
focused programs has to be at a similar, or higher, level. 
Here we need, however, a word of caution. Recent research has 
shown that investments in CSR can have severe personal consequences 
for CEOs.5 A study of Fortune 500 firms over a five-year period 
                                                                 
 4. Dean Baker, Can anything bring CEO pay back down to earth?, LA TIMES. 
(Jun. 14, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-baker-ceo-pay-
20180614-story.html [https://perma.cc/N7SD-KD9U]. 
 5. Hubbard, supra note 2, at 2263. 
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showed that environmental and social performance of the firm alters 
the effect that firm performance has on CEO dismissal.6 The research 
showed that CEOs who invested more in these programs had greater 
dismissal rates when firm financial performance was low. The effect 
sizes were quite high: at low levels of financial performance, CEOs 
were 84% more likely to be dismissed if they invested in these 
programs. On the other hand, they were 53% less likely to be dismissed 
if they had strong financial performance. 
When taken together, the rise in prominence of CEOs in modern 
culture, their increasing effect on firm outcomes, and the personal 
consequences they face from investing in environmental programs 
underscores how important it is to understand CEOs in the context of 
investments and stewardship of environmental programs. Indeed, I 
strongly urge those working on issues of environmental 
responsibility—from lawyers to investors and regulators—to carefully 
consider CEOs. They play a significant part in investing in 
environmental programs and choosing to comply with environmental 
laws. They do so, however, at great personal risk—especially given 
the tenuous nature of the relationship between investment in 
environmental programs and financial performance. 
LINKING ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TO FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
There has been wide debate among scholars of strategic 
management on the financial case for Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR)—including environmental programs. As my colleagues and I 
have previously summarized: 
Some research suggests CSR [including environmental programs] 
has a positive influence on firm financial performance because it can 
generate stronger relationships with stakeholders, increase customer 
loyalty, and positively influence corporate reputation. Other research, 
however, suggests that CSR initiatives hinder financial performance 
and come at the expense of shareholders. Still other research finds no 
relationship between CSR and firm financial performance (internal 
citations omitted).7 
                                                                 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
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Indeed, a review by Peloza in 20098 looked at 128 studies that 
explored the CSR–financial outcomes relationship and reported that 
59% found a positive relationship, 27% a mixed or neutral 
relationship, and 14% a negative relationship. Some of the inconsistent 
findings arise because so much goes into how we define CSR and 
environmental performance that it clouds the relationship. Indeed, 
more proximal performance metrics include reduced use9, operational 
efficiencies10, and changes in risk profile.11 These intermediate 
measures were found in only twenty five of the 128 studies Peloza 
examined. 
While more proximal performance metrics are important, so is 
dividing up the measures of environmental and social performance. If, 
at the broadest level, we separate our actions into those based on 
stakeholder strategies, such as environmental programs, from social 
issues, such as nuclear power, we have already shown that stakeholder-
focused programs have a positive effect on shareholder value 
creation.12 This is in contrast to social-issue-focused programs which 
diminish shareholder value.13 
One recent study examined the differences between material and 
immaterial investments in environmental and social programs.14 Not 
all environmental programs are equally beneficial across sectors. For 
example, air quality programs are deemed material in the 
transportation and non-renewable resources industries, but not in 
health care. On the other hand, wastewater management is material for 
health care and non-renewable resources, but not transportation. The 
                                                                 
 8. Peloza, supra note 1. 
 9. Craig R. Carter, Purchasing social responsibility and firm performance: The 
key mediating roles of organizational learning and supplier performance, 35 INT’L 
J. PHYSICAL DISTRIB. & LOGISTICS MGMT. 177, 187 (2005). 
 10. Sanjay Sharma & Harrie Vredenburg, Proactive Corporate Environmental 
Strategy and the Development of Competitively Valuable Organizational 
Capabilities, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 729, 741–42 (1998). 
 11. Mark P. Sharfman & Chitru S. Fernando, Environmental Risk Management 
and the Cost of Capital, 29 STRATEGIC MGMT. J., 569, 569–92 (2008). 
 12. Amy J. Hillman & Gerald D. Keim, Shareholder Value, Stakeholder 
Management, and Social Issues: What’s The Bottom Line?, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
125, 126–29 (2001). 
 13. Id. at 136. 
 14. Mozaffar Khan et al., Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on 
Materiality, 91 THE ACCOUNTING REV. 1697, 1697–724 (2016). 
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authors of the study used Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
(“SASB”) standards to assess the materiality on an industry-by-
industry basis. The study finds that firms with good ratings on material 
sustainability issues outperform firms with poor ratings on these 
issues. In contrast, firms with good ratings on immaterial sustainability 
issues do not significantly outperform firms with poor ratings on the 
same issues. Understanding the materiality of the environmental 
programs on a sector-by-sector basis can help generate a business case 
that is more palatable for executives. 
MOTIVATIONS FOR INVESTING IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS 
Given the less than certain nature of the business case for investing 
in environmental and social programs, the question remains: Why do 
executives invest in sustainability? This question is especially relevant 
given the current political climate where environmental regulations are 
being dismantled at an unprecedented rate. Indeed, in 2016, then 
United States presidential candidate Donald Trump said “We are 
cutting the regulation at a tremendous clip. I would say 70% of 
regulations can go.”15 Regulations did, indeed, have a material effect 
on the quantity and quality of environmental programs. It is in times 
like these, however, that we need to better understand the individuals 
making the decisions—especially considering that they will have more 
latitude as regulation decreases. 
There are many reasons for executives to invest in environmental 
programs including the espoused values of the firm, instrumental 
motivations, the stewardship perspective of the firm’s leadership, 
stakeholder-focused insurance-like motivations, and institutional and 
stakeholder pressures. I will explain each of these in turn. 
First, a firm’s espoused values can serve as a guidepost for 
executives when making environmental decisions. Some firms have a 
stronger environmental mindset and message than others. The rise of 
B corporations—”a label meant to reflect a firm’s ethical, social, 
                                                                 
 15. Chris Kaufman, Republican Trump says 70 percent of federal regulations 
‘can go,’ REUTERS, (Oct. 6, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-
trump-regulations/republican-trump-says-70-percent-of-federal-regulations-can-go-
idUSKCN12629R [https://perma.cc/HKG3-KJEY]. 
2018] ROLE OF CEO IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 19 
 
environmental practices”16—is an example of a trend. Over 2,500 
companies have been certified as B corporations as of August 2018.17 
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream company was founded with social and 
environmental responsibility at the core of the business and it was an 
early adopter of the B corporation status. Executives of these firms are 
expected to make decisions in line with those espoused values. These 
types of values are, however, generally set at the founding of the 
company and are extremely sticky. As a person working in or 
interacting with a firm, understanding this baseline level of interest in 
social programs can serve as a guidepost for how interactions on 
environmental stewardship may play out. 
Second, some executives have an instrumental motivation to invest 
in environmental programs.18 This is founded on the business case, or 
the belief in the business case for environmental investments.19 As I 
discussed above, however, the business case is far from clear. As such, 
the institutional motivations are difficult to identify on a broad basis. 
Research is increasingly clear that believing in the relationship 
between corporate social responsibility and corporate financial 
performance leads to the tendency to invest in CSR.20 As future 
empirical research digs deeper into the types of investments—from 
material to stakeholder-focused—it can be hoped that we will see 
better support for a business case for environmental programs. This is 
not to say that on a project-by-project basis there are not business cases 
for environmentally friendly programs at firms; instead, based on the 
current state of scientific literature, the broadest of business cases is 
not well established. 
                                                                 
 16. Choosing plan B, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/08/09/danone-rethinks-the-idea-of-the-
firm [https://perma.cc/8UZF-5PTV]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, The Stakeholder Theory of the 
Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 65, 71 
(1995). 
 19. Sebastian Hafenbrädl & Daniel Waeger, Ideology and the Micro-foundations 
of CSR: Why Executives Believe in the Business Case for CSR and how this Affects 
their CSR Engagements, 60 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1582 (2017). 
 20. Id. at 1600. 
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Third, some executives take a stewardship perspective, rather than 
an economic perspective to running their firm.21 This perspective is 
founded on “a moral imperative for managers to ‘do the right thing,’ 
without regard to how such decisions affect firm performance.”22 This 
moral imperative enables executives to ignore the potential downside 
risks of investing in environmental programs within their firms. 
Executives that take a stewardship perspective choose to identify with 
high value commitments and have higher order needs including 
achievement and self-actualization.23 Stewards of their organizations 
take the necessary long-term orientation to invest in environmental 
programs that the self-serving economic man chooses not to. As such, 
strategic management scholars use stewardship theory to explain some 
of the differences in investment levels within environmental 
programs.24 
Fourth, there has been a lot of discussion in the strategic 
management literature on the idea that investments in environmental 
and social programs can have an insurance-like ability.25 In this 
perspective, environmental performance can build goodwill in the 
minds of stakeholders. This goodwill serves as a type of insurance that 
allows for stakeholders to maintain support for organizations 
following small transgressions. As such, executives can choose to 
invest in environmental programs in order to protect their 
organizations in the future if they happen to suffer an environmental 
mishap. 
Fifth, there are institutional and stakeholder pressures to take a more 
environmental and social approach to business. A recent example 
typifies this type of pressure. In January 2018, numerous CEOs 
received letters from Larry Fink, the CEO of BlackRock—the world’s 
largest investment management firm. In that letter Mr. Fink asked 
                                                                 
 21. See James H. Davis et al., Toward a stewardship theory of management, 22 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 20 (1977) 
 22. Abagail McWilliams et al., Corporate Social Responsibility: Strategic 
Implications, 43 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1, 3 (2006). 
 23. Davis, supra note 21, at 28. 
 24. See Davis, supra note 21. 
 25. See Paul C. Godfrey et al., The Relationship between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Shareholder Value: An Empirical Test of the Risk Management 
Hypothesis, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 425 (2009). 
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CEOs “How are we managing our impact on the environment?”26 The 
letter received wide attention27 and is an exemplar of the potential 
influence that institutions and stakeholders can have on the future 
environmental performance of firms. 
Finally, one interesting and potentially fruitful line of investigation 
on the antecedents of investments in environmental programs is the 
study of the personal dispositions of executives making these 
decisions. That is, there is something about the executives themselves 
leads them to tend to invest more or less in sustainability. The next 
section delves deeper into the current strategic management literature 
focused on individual differences of CEOs and how they manifest in 
decisions to invest in environmental and social performance. 
EXECUTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
Research into the characteristics of executives has yielded many 
fruitful findings in the broad strategic management literature.28 Only 
recently, however, has there been major work on understanding how 
the individual differences that CEOs possess influence their choice to 
invest in environmental and social programs. At this point in the 
strategic management literature, most studies focus on the broad 
construct of CSR or Corporate Social Performance (CSP).29 Within 
that construct lies the focus of this essay: firm environmental 
responsibility, investment, and performance. Typically, at best, these 
studies publish supplemental results that separate out environmental 
performance from the other broad categories. Thus, some of the 
findings reported here investigate the broader construct of CSR, the 
results, however, should still be applicable in the context of 
environmental investment and performance. 
                                                                 
 26. Larry Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BLACKROCK (2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/investor-relations/larry-
fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/NQ76-DFT5]. 
 27. Interview with John Ydstie, Correspondent, NPR (Jan. 16, 2018) (transcript 
available at https://www.npr.org/2018/01/16/578422424/blackrock-ceo-says-
companies-need-to-do-more-than-deliver-profits [https://perma.cc/G7RP-WU75]). 
 28. SYDNEY FINKELSTEIN ET. AL., STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP: THEORY AND 
RESEARCH ON EXECUTIVES, TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS, AND BOARDS (2009). 
 29. Herman Aguinis & Ante Glavas, What We Know and Don’t Know About 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Review and Research Agenda, 38 J. MGMT. 932 
(2012). 
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Studies on executive decision making are typically founded in two 
theoretical streams: those which focus on the agency of the executive30 
and those which focus on how individual differences influence 
information processing.31 Both of these theories allow for executive 
characteristics to influence firm decisions. In this section, I review 
recent studies that examine how political ideology, narcissism, hubris, 
charisma, ability, intellectual stimulation, and fair market ideology all 
influence an executive’s choice to invest in environmental and social 
programs. 
Political ideology is defined as a “set of beliefs about the proper 
order of society and how it can be achieved.”32 Two factors play an 
important role in aligning an executive with either a more liberal or 
more conservative orientation.33 First, executives differ on their level 
of openness versus resistance to change. Second, they differ on their 
acceptance versus rejection of inequality. Both of these two factors 
form an executive’s overall political ideology. Ideology has been 
linked to many outcomes in strategic management such as tax 
avoidance,34 research and development investment,35 and CEO pay. 
Political ideology—both at the CEO level36 and the organizational 
level37—has also seen support for influencing corporate social 
                                                                 
 30. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: 
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, J. FIN. ECONS., 305 
(1976); Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency theory: An Assessment and Review, 14 
ACAD. MGMT. REV., 57–74 (1989). 
 31. See Donald C. Hambrick & Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The 
Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers, 9 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 193 (1984). 
 32. Robert S. Erikson & Kent L. Tedin, AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION 64 (Taylor 
& Francis, 6th ed. 2000). 
 33. John T. Jost et al., Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective 
Affinities, 60 ANNUAL REV. OF PSYCHOL. 307 (2009). 
 34. See Dane M. Christensen et al., Top management conservatism and corporate 
risk strategies: Evidence from managers’ personal political orientation and 
corporate tax avoidance, 36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.1918 (2014). 
 35. See Irena Hutton et al., Corporate Policies of Republican Managers, 49 J. 
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1279 (2014). 
 36. See M.K. Chin et al., Political Ideologies of CEOs: The Influence of 
Executives’ Values on Corporate Social Responsibility, 58 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 197 
(2013). 
 37. See Abhinav Gupta et al., Red, blue, and purple firms: Organizational 
political ideology and corporate social responsibility, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1018 
(2017). 
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responsibility. Political ideologies of CEOs are manifested in their 
firms’ CSR profiles with more liberal CEOs having higher scores in 
Corporate Social Performance—of which environmental performance 
is one indicator. This effect was shown to be amplified by the CEO’s 
level of power within the organization. It is also important to note that 
more conservative CEOs are more willing to invest in CSR when 
recent firm performance is high; liberal CEOs’ CSR performance, on 
the other hand, is less contingent on recent performance. When 
interacting with executives, environmental lawyers may wish to 
consider the executive’s political ideology—especially given its power 
to predict a firm’s environmental and social performance and the 
convenience and accessibility of records of political donations. 
Personality factors also contribute to CEO decision making and 
investment strategies. Narcissism is a personality factor that has 
received much attention in the strategic management literature.38 
Narcissists “have a high need for attention and praise as well as a 
strong desire to have their positive self-views reinforced.”39 They need 
their self-image to be reinforced constantly from external sources. As 
mentioned above, investments in Corporate Social Responsibly are 
highly visible. As such, research has shown that firms led by 
narcissistic CEOs have higher levels of Corporate Social Performance. 
40 This effect, however, has to be taken into context. Narcissists tend 
to invest in programs that derive public praise, not necessarily because 
of their linkage to a business case. As such, their firm’s financial 
performance suffers as they make more investments in CSR. Their 
media profile, however, increases dramatically. Thus, overall, when 
working with narcissistic CEOs, framing environmental investment 
decisions as worthy of public praise may be one tool to influence them. 
                                                                 
 38. See David H. Zhu & Guoli Chen, CEO Narcissism and the Impact of Prior 
Board Experience on Corporate Strategy, 60 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 31 (2015); William J. 
Wales et al., In Pursuit of Greatness: CEO Narcissism, Entrepreneurial Orientation, 
and Firm Performance Variance, 50 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1041 (2013); 
Pankaj C. Patel & Danielle Cooper, The harder they fall, the faster they rise: 
Approach and avoidance focus in narcissistic CEOs, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 35, 
1528 (2013). 
 39. Oleg V. Petrenko et al., Corporate Social Responsibility or CEO Narcissism? 
CSR Motivations and Organizational Performance, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 262, 
263 (2016). 
 40. Id. 
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Hubris is another psychological factor that plays an important role 
in CEO decision making. Hubris is defined as extreme pride coupled 
with immense self-confidence.41 Recent research divided 
environmental and social performance into responsible and 
irresponsible activities.42 Researchers examined CEOs of Standard & 
Poor 1500 firms over a decade. Their results showed that CEO hubris 
leads to higher levels of irresponsible investments (defined as concerns 
in Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co., Inc. ratings) and lower level of 
responsible investments (those categorized as strengths in the 
rankings).43 Hubristic CEOs prefer to make investments that are not 
dependent on other stakeholders—such as environmental programs—
in order to maintain control of their organizations. Furthermore, they 
prefer internal financing and are poor at estimating how much 
resources are required for specific investments. As such, they have a 
double handicap: they overestimate how much environmental 
programs would cost and assume that they would only have internal 
resources available for such investments. 
Charismatic CEOs are characterized by their ability to influence 
followers and build a shared organizational identity.44 Their ability to 
set a vision for the company is accompanied by their ability to have 
that vision permeate throughout their organization. Furthermore, 
charismatic CEOs tend to espouse prosocial values. These prosocial 
values—including, as Wowak and colleagues describe, “integrity, 
justice, and marinating societal good”—increase the likelihood that 
CEOs will consider many different stakeholders in their decision-
making process, leading to a tendency for charismatic CEOs to 
perform better on environmentally and socially responsible 
                                                                 
 41. Mathew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums 
Paid for Large Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 106 
(1997); see also Nathan J. Hiller & Donald C. Hambrick, Conceptualizing executive 
hubris: The role of (hyper-)core self-evaluations in strategic decision-making, 26 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 297 (2005). 
 42. Yi Tang et al., How CEO Hubris Affects Corporate Social (Ir)responsibility, 
36 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1338, 1339 (2015). 
 43. Id. at 1348–51. 
 44. Adam J. Wowak et al., Earthquake or Glacier? How CEO Charisma 
Manifests in Firm Strategy Over Time, 37 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 586, 588 (2016). 
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dimensions.45 These effects have been shown to increase over the 
tenure of a charismatic CEO. Charismatic leaders, therefore, have the 
benefit of looking at environmental issues from a number of different 
perspectives and being able to influence their organizations to 
implement environmental solutions. 
CEO ability, or the capability of a CEO to translate firm resources 
into profits, is another factor that has been shown to have an influence 
on the level of Corporate Social Performance.46 Investments in 
environmental and social programs are complex and may take time to 
materialize into financial returns—if at all. Given the relationship 
between CSR and CEO dismissal, investing in CSR has to be coupled 
with strong financial performance, lest a CEO face dismissal. CEO 
ability—their latent overall quality—thus enables certain CEOs to 
make investments in these programs. They are the ones who are better 
positioned to capitalize on these investments and steward them 
through their lifecycles. These CEOs are also typically on longer time 
horizons; that is, they don’t need to demonstrate extremely short-term 
profits like CEOs with lower abilities. This all leads to higher 
environmental and social performance. 
CEO intellectual stimulation is another factor that has been shown 
to influence CSR decisions. CEO intellectual stimulation “involves 
leader actions geared toward the arousal and change in problem 
awareness and problem solving on the part of followers, as well as 
beliefs and values.”47 Research has shown a positive relationship 
between CEO intellectual stimulation and what the authors term 
“strategic CSR,” of which environmental performance is the strongest 
component.48 Leaders with higher levels of intellectual stimulation 
will consider the environment more broadly and possess complex 
mental maps that allow them to move beyond basic profit and loss 
strategies. 
Finally, a recent study investigated the role that fair market ideology 
has in the tendency for executives to engage in environmentally and 
                                                                 
 45. David A. Waldman et al., Components of CEO Transformational Leadership 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, 43 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1703, 1707 (2006); 
Wowak et al., supra note 43, at 591. 
 46. Yuan Yuan et al., CEO Ability and Corporate Social Responsibility, J. BUS. 
ETHICS. 1 (July 2017) 
 47. Waldman et al., supra note 44, at 1709. 
 48. Id. at 1715–17. 
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socially responsible programs.49 Fair market ideology is one’s 
proclivity to support, even idealize, the market economy system. It is 
typically formed early in life, through formal education. Fair market 
ideology influences two mediators that explain the relationship to the 
tendency to invest in environment and social programs. First, it helps 
strengthen the belief in the linkage between CSR and corporate 
financial performance. Instead of relying on a factual business case for 
environmental programs, an executive’s worldview is able to 
substitute. Second, fair market ideology reduces moral outrage. It does 
this by lowering an executive’s moral emotions—that is, reducing their 
awareness of moral issues. This reduction in moral outrage cancels out 
the effect of belief in fair market ideology on the tendency to invest in 
environmental and social programs within firms. Overall, the study 
shows that executives who have a strong belief in fair market values 
are subject to opposing influences vis-à-vis investments in 
environmental programs. Stakeholders working with these executives 
should be aware that they are predisposed to believe in the business 
case, and that this case can be strengthened by focusing on the moral 
aspects of environmental protections. 
SOCIAL FACTORS 
Another interesting line of research examines the social factors 
surrounding investment in and performance of environmental 
programs. CEOs do not make decisions in a vacuum. Instead, they are 
surrounded by their families, shareholders, stakeholders, and their 
company’s boards of directors. Each of these groups has been shown 
to have an influence on firm-level environmental and social 
performance. 
In one of the more interesting studies, researchers have investigated 
the influence that having a daughter has on the decision for CEOs to 
invest in CSR—including performance in environmental practices.50 
This research is rooted in the female socialization hypothesis that 
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(2017). 
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“suggests an attitudinal shift arises from parenting daughters.”51 When 
a firm’s CEO has a daughter, the level of environmental performance 
is about 5.2% higher, compared to a median firm. 
Another social factor is shareholder activism—the process by which 
shareholders use shareholder proposals to express their disapproval of 
a firm’s actions.52 In a recent survey of 300 directors of United States 
publicly traded firms, over eighty percent of directors agreed with the 
statement that activism creates a “negative distraction for management 
and the board.”53 Furthermore, while it is potentially intuitive that 
shareholders may use shareholder proposals to increase the level of 
environmental and social performance within the firm, research shows 
that the opposite often occurs.54 The authors of the study explain that 
“rather than pressuring firms to improve [Corporate Social 
Performance], activism may merely engender diversion of resources 
away from [Corporate Social Performance] into political activities 
used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion.”55 
Powerful stakeholders also serve as another social influencer on the 
behavior of CEOs. The CEO hubris study discussed above had another 
finding that has implications for the social effects of stakeholders. The 
researchers showed that dependence on stakeholders for resources 
dampens the negative effects of hubris on environmental and social 
investments.56 Resource dependence, thus, can serve as a social check 
on CEOs who, based on their personality, may be ill-disposed to 
engage in responsible investments, while preferring irresponsible 
investments. 
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The board capital—the collective experience, knowledge, and 
networks of the directors serving on a corporation’s board—has been 
shown to be an influential factor on increasing the level of 
environmental disclosure in firms.57 Boards with high levels of human 
and social capital are able to advise CEOs better than those with lower 
levels of board capital. They are able to take a wider view of the 
company and the environment—and consider multiple stakeholders 
more effectively. As such, they are more likely to be able to recognize 
the benefits of environmental disclosures and convince executives to 
implement such disclosures. 
STRUCTURES 
Another factor that can play into a CEO’s choice to invest in 
programs to support the natural environment is the pay structure of the 
executive.58 Specifically, the short-term and long-term pay structure 
influence the level of performance of environmental programs. Short-
term pay includes, for example, the bonuses awarded to a CEO in a 
given year. Long-term pay includes restricted stock and stock options. 
The results of an analysis of the Standard & Poor’s 500 firms in 2001 
show that short-term-focused pay decreases the level of performance 
in environmentally friendly programs, while long-term-focused pay 
increases the level.59 This provides evidence that the compensation a 
CEO receives does have influence on their propensity to invest in and 
steward environmentally friendly programs within their firms. 
Beyond the compensation structure of the CEO, the structure of the 
firm can have an impact on the level of CSR, including 
environmentally friendly programs.60 Decentralization—“when 
decision-making power involves individuals at various organizational 
levels”61—shifts decision making from a few key people down to 
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many individual managers. These individual managers are then better 
able to integrate local knowledge and understand stakeholders at a 
more nuanced level than top managers. This leads them to implement 
more environmentally and socially friendly programs. This effect is 
then carried across the firm and, as has been shown in a study of 
Fortune 500 firms from the late 1990s to early 2000s, leads to higher 
levels of investments in such programs.62 
Another structural determinant of the level of social and 
environmental activities is the age of the firm.63 Young ventures—
those less than eight years old64—suffer from a liability of newness, 
whereby they “lack sophisticated operating processes and routines, 
systems and structures for efficient internal communications, and the 
knowledge to establish stable relationships with clients, suppliers, and 
other stakeholders.” 65 Their liability of newness makes it difficult for 
them to appropriate value from their social and environmental 
activities. We see in young ventures that CSR activities don’t yield 
greater financial performance. A long-term orientation, however, is 
one mechanism that can overcome the negative relationship between 
CSR and financial performance for young ventures. Long-term 
orientations focus on the future, encompass a wider field of vision, and 
are typically associated with more complex investments. This shifts 
investments from more superficial investments to those that have a 
longer-term, more impactful effect on financial performance. As 
stakeholders work with young firms, an understanding of their 
temporal orientation can help convince managers of the economic 
value of environmental investments and programs. 
CONCLUSION 
Executives are a critical factor in deciding to invest in environmental 
programs, stewarding those programs, and managing the relationships 
necessary to make them successful. Implementing these programs 
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does not come without their personal risks—poor performance 
following higher levels of environmental and social performance is a 
major determinant of CEO dismissal.66 As I have shown, a number of 
different factors play important roles in the mind of the manager. 
Personality factors such as narcissism, hubris and charisma all 
influence CEO decisions. Their values—such as liberalism and fair 
market ideology—shape their world view, and their decisions 
regarding environmental investments. Finally, cognitive factors such 
as their ability and intellectual stimulation weigh in on their capacity 
to deliver on environmental projects. Beyond these individual factors, 
social factors are also important. I reviewed articles that showed that 
daughters, shareholder activists, and powerful stakeholders all serve as 
influencers of executive decisions in this area. Finally, there are 
structural factors that are important such as a CEO’s pay structure, the 
centralization of the organization, and the age and time orientation of 
the firm. While the studies I have reviewed typically examine each 
factor in isolation, the consistency of their predictions with other 
factors shows broad trends that can help those working with a variety 
of executives to better understand how they think about complex 
environmental projects. 
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Table: Summary of CEO Factors Influencing Environmental 
Investment and Performance 
Category Factors that Increase Environmental and Social Performance  
Personality Factors  CEO Liberalism (Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 2013) 
 CEO Narcissism (Petrenko, Aime, Ridge & Hill, 2016) 
 CEO Hubris [reduces] (Tang, Qian, Chen & Shen, 2015) 
 CEO Charisma (Wowak et al., 2016) 
 CEO Ability (Yuan, Tian, Lu & Yu, 2017) 
 CEO Intellectual Stimulation (Waldman, Siegel, & Javidan, 2006) 
 Fair Market Ideology (Hafenbradl & Waeger, 2017) 
Social Factors  Having a Daughter (Cronqvist & Yu, 2017) 
 Shareholder Activism [reduces] (David, Bloom & Hillman, 2007) 
 Powerful Stakeholders (Tang, Qian, Chen & Shen, 2015) 
 Board Capital (Muttakin, Khan & Mihret, 2018) 
Structural Factors  CEO Long-Term Pay Structure (Deckop, Merriman & Gupta, 2006) 
 Decentralized Structure (Wong, Ormiston & Tetlock, 2011) 
 Long-Term Orientation (Wang & Bansal, 2012) 
 
